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Abstract. Audience response systems, also known as clickers, are used
at many academic institutions to offer active learning environments.
Since these systems are used to administer graded assignments, and
sometimes even exams, it is crucial to assess their security. Our work
seeks to exploit and document potential vulnerabilities of clickers. For
this purpose, we use software defined radios to perform jamming, sniff-
ing and spoofing attacks on an audience response system in production,
which provide different possible methods of cheating. The results of our
study demonstrate that clickers are easily exploitable. We build a pro-
totype and show that it is practically possible to covertly steal or forge
answers of a peer or even an entire classroom, with high levels of con-
fidence. Additionally, we find that the receivers software of the system
lacks protection against unexpected answers, which allows our spoofer
to submit any ASCII character and opens the receiver up to possible
fuzzing attacks. As a result of this study, we discourage using clickers for
high-stake assessments, unless they provide proper security protection.
1 Introduction
Many institutions employ Turning Technologies’ Response Cards [7], also known
as clickers, to create active learning environments and encourage students’ par-
ticipation in their classes. Clickers are wireless devices that let instructors poll
students for purposes such as taking attendance, and administering quizzes
and/or surveys. Research has shown that such a learning tool can greatly im-
prove students’ learning abilities and engagement with material if the clickers
are used effectively [4–6].
While many universities limit their use of these clickers to attendance moni-
toring and in-class polls, some educational institutions go so far as to administer
clicker-based exams. University of Maryland of Baltimore County shows evi-
dence of having administered these types of exams in the past. A post on the
university’s Division of Information Technology page includes a quotation of a
student expressing favor for these exams, commenting “I liked taking the exam
on the clickers because we had our own exam booklet in front of us and could
go at our own pace. I also liked getting my grade back right away.” [1]
The popularity of clickers raises the question of whether these devices are
actually secure. In particular, since clickers transmit over radio frequencies, is it
possible for a student or another party to block, eavesdrop, or change answers
submitted by other students?
In this paper, we answer this question in the affirmative. We build a prototype
of a fake receiver (sniffer) and a fake clicker (spoofer) using the HackRF One
software defined radio platform [2]. Using information provided by the sniffer or
the functionality of a spoofer, a student can cheat in various ways, e.g., by finding
out the most commonly submitted answer, looking at the answer submitted by
a particular student (assuming the clickerID of that student is known), or by
altering the answer submitted by other students. Furthermore, we uncover new
information about the TurningPoint receiver and polling software that could lead
to additional vulnerabilities in the form of fuzzing. Specifically, we find these
technologies do not fully sanitize user input, allowing our spoofer to submit
unexpected answers to polls.
2 The Tools
2.1 The HackRF One
The specific software defined radio used in this project to assess the security
of Turning Technologies’ Response Cards is Scott Gadgets’ HackRF One. The
HackRF One [2] is a hardware device able to capture radio signals via an antenna
and stream the signal data captured through USB into another device, oftentimes
a computer operating on a Linux-based operating system. This stream of data
can then be modified and analyzed with software.
2.2 GNU Radio
With the HackRF One offering the hardware support for this project, the soft-
ware GNU Radio [3] is used to perform signal processing and analysis on the
digital input received via USB port. GNU Radio has become an increasingly pop-
ular tool for research, due to its customizability and simple GUI interface [8].
This user-friendly GUI interface is known as GNU Radio Companion, often
abbreviated GRC. GNU Radio offers the software equivalent of nearly every
hardware tool used in signal processing, making it an extremely powerful tool
for this project.
3 Reverse Engineering
The procedure of receiving a data packet requires filtering the signal, demodulat-
ing it with the correct modulation scheme, synchronizing clocks with the signal’s
data rate, transforming the demodulated signal into a binary data stream (data
consisting of 0 and 1 values), then interpreting the binary data stream in or-
der to discover packets sent by the clicker. In order to implement attacks such
Table 1. TurningPoint Clicker Specifications
Operating Freq. Bandwidth Modulation Scheme Baud Rate
2.401GHz - 2.482GHz 1 MHz GFSK 1 Mbps
Fig. 1. GNU Radio implementation of the receiver.
as sniffing and spoofing, it is important to determine how clickers operate. To
find the necessary information, we take advantage of specifications of the Nordic
nRF24LE1 chip, data from the FCC website, and analysis of the clicker signal
captured through the HackRF One. The information we found is summarized in
Table. 1.
The final information required is the packet structure for the sake of sniff-
ing and spoofing packets. The packet structure contains 8-bit preamble, 24-bit
target address, 24-bit source address, 8-bit payload, and 16-bit CRC, where the
preamble and target address are permanently 0x55 and 0x123456 and the CRC
algorithm is CRC-CCITT (0xFFFF).
4 Sniffer Implementation
4.1 Flowgraph Blocks.
The GNU Radio flowgraph (see Fig. 1) consists of the following blocks:
1. The Osmocom Source generates a stream of complex numbers based on
the signal that the HackRF One receives via its antenna.
2. This stream of numbers is passed through a Low Pass Filter in order
to filter out all signals aside from the desired 1 MHz bandwidth clicker
transmission channel.
3. That filtered stream of data is then passed through a GFSK Demod block
which demodulates a GFSK modulated signal into bits.
4. Lastly, this stream of deciphered bits is pushed into the File Sink which
saves the binary stream into a file.
4.2 GRC Implementation.
The only remaining step is to find a way to parse the binary stream in real
time. To that end, we create a new block using GRC itself to decipher the
packets. GNU Radio provides the option of writing custom blocks using C++
or Python, based on so-called Out-of-Tree (OOT) modules. Such modules are
useful when one needs to implement a new function that GRC does not provide
in its existing library. Toward this end, we create a simple Man-in-the-Middle
block which directly parses the output from the GFSK Demod and logs the found
packets to GRC’s built-in console. We call the block Hex Decode (see Fig. 1),
as it decodes the binary stream into hex.
5 Results
In order to assess the security of using clickers for high-stake graded assignments,
we demonstrate jamming attacks, sniffing attacks, and spoofing attacks using the
HackRF One device and gauge the efficiency of these attacks.
5.1 Sniffing
The goal of sniffing is to stealthily and passively acquire knowledge of others’
answers and packet submissions. According to benchmarking results, sniffing
should perform extraordinarily well within a lecture hall or classroom setting.
An accuracy near or above 90% is achieved at almost all distances within 25 feet,
with distance within 10 feet having near perfect results. Additionally, the sniffer
receives on average twice as many packets as the receiver does, which means
it is less prone to errors and could receive an answer earlier then the receiver.
We note that in most scenarios, the user would be sitting near other clickers,
generally within a vicinity of 25 feet radius. Thus, the clickers are extremely
vulnerable to a sniffing attack, as such an attack is expected to receive nearly
all answers that are submitted within the classroom.
5.2 Spoofing
Throughout our tests, we discovered several possible attacks using spoofed pack-
ets.
1. Forging answers. One attack involves changing the answers of other stu-
dents. Once a clicker ID is known, the attacker can spoof a packet with the
same ID with a different answer. The receiver, believing the packet is sent
from the real clicker simply changes the answer stored for that ID, without
notifying the student whose answer was altered. Since the HackRF One can
quickly switch between transmitting and receiving, it is possible to collect
IDs from an entire classroom of students and alter each answer in seconds.
2. Tampering course statistics. A second vulnerability lies in sending fake
answers using fake IDs. Because all clicker IDs are a 6 digit hex number,
it is possible to randomize an ID and an answer to provide false data. The
TurningPoint software provides in-depth statistics to the teacher or professor
for each question and poll. With skewed data, teachers and professors could
apply inaccurate curves to quizzes and exams or focus on teaching material
which most students already understand.
3. Fuzzing. Furthermore, while experimenting with the HackRF One spoofer,
we found that the TurningPoint receiver has the ability to receive any two
digit ASCII code in hex. While the TurningPoint clickers can only submit
single digit, numerical answers (i.e., 0-9), the spoofer has the ability to send
other two-digit ASCII hex code, including letters, mathematical symbols,
punctuation, and control characters, such as the “Null” character. We dis-
covered that the TurningPoint receiver does not outrightly reject or ignore
such malformed inputs, which implies that the polling software could be
open to brand new fuzzing attacks.
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